

**IRIS Public Record****Key Information**

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NUMPAGE 281

Title Extensions:

**Abstract**

Descriptive TARGET NOT INDICATED.

Notes:

Title MISSION REPORTS: FOLDER NUMBER 3

Added

Entries

Author:

Subject:

Major Command:

**Administrative Markings**

No Administrative Markings Listed

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GR416-SU-OP-3  
11 JAN 1945

# A-26 MISSION REPORTS

## FOLDER NO.3

MISSION NO.	F.O. NO.	DATE
185	127 - 707	14 JAN. 45
186	128 - 708	15 " 45
187	129 - 709	16 " 45
188	134 - 714	21 " 45
189	131 - 715	22 " 45
190	136 - 716	22 " 45
191	138 - 718	23 " 45
192	138 - 718	23 " 45
193	139 - 719	24 " 45
194	140 - 720	25 " 45
195	144 - 724	29 " 45
196	147 - 728	1 FEB. 45
197	149 - 730	2 " 45
198	153 - 731	3 " 45
199	158 - 136	6 " 45
200	160 - 738	8 " 45

P.R.C.

00002001

DECLASSIFIED  
BOD DIR 2000/11/17 Sep 58

SCANNED BY ACD  
2007

MICROFILMED

1386-40

S E C R E T

ANNEX "A"

BOMBING INFORMATION

IX B.C. FIELD ORDER NO 110-730BOX I, Flight 1 GROUP A16 DATE 25 Jan. 1945 TARGET ATTACKED Ball Road Junction1. Method of Sighting: Pre-set with corrections.2. Bombing approach: 60°3. Was mercury erection system used? YES \_\_\_ NO X4. Did entire ~~crew~~ (flight) drop on lead bombardier? YES X NO \_\_\_

In either case explain fully method of sighting and dropping of bombs, and specify exact aiming point actually used:

Pre-set with corrections. G-1 Auto Pilot not used.

5. Name of lead Bombardier: Lt. R. Gento6. Name of lead Pilot: Capt. D.A. Hales7. Intervalometer setting: Minimum8. Indicated Air Speed: 210 Ground Speed: 250 Altitude: 12,0009. Length of bomb run: 30 Sec:10. Bomb Load and Fusing per A/C: A-20 4 x 500 lb. FUSED 1/10 N 1/40 T11. Total Bombs Dropped: 20 A-20 4 x 500 lb. 1/10 1/40

12. Full statement of all factors affecting bombing - including: -

(a) Did weather conditions or visibility adversely affect identification of target attacked or bombing. YES \_\_\_ NO X. If "YES" state conditions and effect.

(b) Apart from weather or visibility, was any difficulty encountered in identifying target attacked, IP or AP? YES \_\_\_ NO X. If answer is "YES", state circumstances and effect on bombing:

(c) Did Flak affect bombing? YES \_\_\_ NO X. If answer is "YES", state to what extent did flak affect bombing or bomb run:

(d) To what extent did attacks by enemy aircraft affect bombing?

None  
(e) State any difficulties on bombing run:


None  
(f) Malfunctions, personnel errors or other factors affecting bombing:

(g) Bombing results as reported by crews:

Aimed at right Target: YES X NO \_\_\_

Results claimed: EXCEL X GOOD \_\_\_ FAIR \_\_\_ POOR \_\_\_ GROSS \_\_\_

S E C R E T



## S E C R E T

ANNEX "A"

BOMBING INFORMATION

IX B.C. FIELD ORDER NO. 140-730BOX X, Flight 2 GROUP 416 DATE 25 Jan. 1945 TARGET ATTACKED Roll Road Junction1. Method of Sighting: Pre-set with corrections.2. Bombing approach: 60°3. Was mercury erection system used? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO X4. Did entire ~~boom~~ (flight) drop on lead bombardier? YES X NO \_\_\_\_\_

In either case explain fully method of sighting and dropping of bombs, and specify exact aiming point actually used:

Pre-set with corrections. G-1 Auto Pilot not used.

5. Name of lead Bombardier: Lt. H.L. Kirk6. Name of lead Pilot: Capt. H.A. Monroe7. Intervalometer setting: Minimum8. Indicated Air Speed: 210 Ground Speed: 250 Altitude: 12,2009. Length of bomb run: 25 Sec:10. Bomb Load and Fusing per A/C: 20 x 500 lb. FUSED 1/10 N 1/40 T11. Total Bombs Dropped: 27 ~~4-26~~ 6 x 500 lb. 1/10 1/40

12. Full statement of all factors effecting bombing - including: -

(a) Did weather conditions or visibility adversely affect identification of target attacked or bombing. YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO X. If "YES" state conditions and effect.

(b) Apart from weather or visibility, was any difficulty encountered in identifying target attacked, IP or AP? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO X. If answer is "YES", state circumstances and effect on bombing:

(c) Did Flak affect bombing? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO X. If answer is "YES", state to what extent did flak affect bombing or bomb run:

(d) To what extent did attacks by enemy aircraft affect bombing?

None

(e) State any difficulties on bombing run:

None

(f) Malfunctions, personnel errors or other factors affecting bombing:


None

(g) Bombing results as reported by crews:

Aimed at right Target: YES X NO \_\_\_\_\_

Results claimed: EXCEL X GOOD \_\_\_\_\_ FAIR \_\_\_\_\_ POOR \_\_\_\_\_ GROSS \_\_\_\_\_

S E C R E T



## S E C R E T

ANNEX "A"

BOMBING INFORMATION

IX B.C. FIELD ORDER NO. 140-780BOX X, Flight 3 GROUP 416 DATE 25 Jan. 1945 TARGET ATTACKED Ball Road Junction1. Method of Sighting: Pre-set with corrections.2. Bombing approach: 7°3. Was mercury erection system used? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO X4. Did entire ~~(bomb)~~ (flight) drop on lead bombardier? YES X NO \_\_\_\_\_

In either case explain fully method of sighting and dropping of bombs, and specify exact aiming point actually used:

Pre-set with corrections. G-1 Auto Pilot not used.5. Name of lead Bombardier: Lt. A.E. Rosenquist6. Name of lead Pilot: Lt. R.R. Singletary7. Intervalometer setting: Minimum8. Indicated Air Speed: 210 Ground Speed: 256 Altitude: 11,8009. Length of bomb run: 30 Sec:10. Bomb Load and Fusing per A/C: A-20 4 x 500 lb. FUSED 1/10 N 1/40 T11. Total Bombs Dropped: 22 A-20 6 x 500 lb. 1/10 1/40

12. Full statement of all factors affecting bombing - including: -

(a) Did weather conditions or visibility adversely affect identification of target attacked or bombing. YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO X. If "YES" state conditions and effect.(b) Apart from weather or visibility, was any difficulty encountered in identifying target attacked, IP or AP? YES X NO \_\_\_\_\_. If answer is "YES", state circumstances and effect on bombing: Could not locate AP in time for proper run.(c) Did Flak affect bombing? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO X. If answer is "YES", state to what extent did flak affect bombing or bomb run:


(d) To what extent did attacks by enemy aircraft affect bombing?

None(e) State any difficulties on bombing run: Same as (b) above.(f) Malfunctions, personnel errors or other factors affecting bombing: None.

(g) Bombing results as reported by crews:

Aimed at right Target: YES X NO \_\_\_\_\_Results claimed: EXCEL \_\_\_\_\_ GOOD \_\_\_\_\_ FAIR \_\_\_\_\_ POOR X GROSS \_\_\_\_\_

S E C R E T





S E C R E T

ANNEX "A"

BOMBING INFORMATION

IX B.C. FIELD ORDER NO. 140-780BOX II, Flight 1 GROUP 426 DATE 25 Jan. 1945 TARGET ATTACKED Kell Road Junction1. Method of Sighting: Eye-sight with corrections.2. Bombing approach: 106°3. Was mercury erection system used? YES \_\_\_ NO X4. Did entire (~~box~~) flight drop on lead bombardier? YES X NO \_\_\_

In either case explain fully method of sighting and dropping of bombs, and specify exact aiming point actually used:

Eye-sight with corrections. C-1 Auto Pilot not used.5. Name of lead Bombardier: Lt. A.S. Collesay6. Name of lead Pilot: Capt. B.D. Stebbins7. Intervalometer setting: Minimum8. Indicated Air Speed: 210 Ground Speed: 255 Altitude: 11,4009. Length of bomb run: 40 Sec:10. Bomb Load and Fusing per A/C: 4-20 lx 500 lb. FUSED 1/10 N 1/10 T11. Total Bombs Dropped: 17 A-26 6 x 500 lb. 1/10 1/10

12. Full statement of all factors effecting bombing - including: -

(a) Did weather conditions or visibility adversely affect identification of target attacked or bombing. YES \_\_\_ NO X. If "YES" state conditions and effect.(b) Apart from weather or visibility, was any difficulty encountered in identifying target attacked, IP or AP? YES \_\_\_ NO X. If answer is "YES", state circumstances and effect on bombing:(c) Did Flak affect bombing? YES \_\_\_ NO X. If answer is "YES", state to what extent did flak affect bombing or bomb run:

(d) To what extent did attacks by enemy aircraft affect bombing?

None  
(e) State any difficulties on bombing run:None  
(f) Malfunctions, personnel errors or other factors affecting bombing:None


(g) Bombing results as reported by crews:

Aimed at right Target: YES X NO \_\_\_

Results claimed: EXCEL \_\_\_ GOOD \_\_\_ FAIR \_\_\_ POOR \_\_\_ GROSS \_\_\_

SUPERIOR X

S E C R E T



## S E C R E T

ANNEX "A"

BOMBING INFORMATION

IX B.C. FIELD ORDER NO. 110-720BOX 11 II, Flt. 2 GROUP 114 DATE 25 Jan. 1945 TARGET ATTACKED Ball Road Junction1. Method of Sighting: Pre-set with corrections.2. Bombing approach: 106°3. Was mercury erection system used? YES \_\_\_ NO X4. Did entire ~~mission~~ (flight) drop on lead bombardier? YES \_\_\_ NO X


In either case explain fully method of sighting and dropping of bombs, and specify exact aiming point actually used: G-1 auto-pilot not used. On first run (PIT) did not make sighting operation because of insufficient time. On second run bombs went away as bomb doors opened, due to pilot's release button being frozen and closing bomb circuit switch. Malfunction.

5. Name of lead Bombardier: Lt. V. Form6. Name of lead Pilot: Capt. G.M. McMalty7. Intervalometer setting: Minimum8. Indicated Air Speed: 210 Ground Speed: 256 Altitude: 11,7009. Length of bomb run: -- Sec:10. Bomb Load and Fusing per A/C: A-20 4 x 500 lb. FUSED 1/10 N 1/40 T11. Total Bombs Dropped: 16 A-26 6 x 500 1/10 1/40

12. Full statement of all factors affecting bombing - including: -

- (a) Did weather conditions or visibility adversely affect identification of target attacked or bombing. YES \_\_\_ NO X. If "YES" state conditions and effect.
- (b) Apart from weather or visibility, was any difficulty encountered in identifying target attacked, IP or AP? YES X NO \_\_\_. If answer is "YES", state circumstances and effect on bombing: Snow made target difficult to pick up.
- (c) Did flak affect bombing? YES \_\_\_ NO X. If answer is "YES", state to what extent did flak affect bombing or bomb run:
- (d) To what extent did attacks by enemy aircraft affect bombing?  
None
- (e) State any difficulties on bombing run:  
Premature release.
- (f) Malfunctions, personnel errors or other factors affecting bombing:  
Pilot's release button frozen causing bombs to go away as bomb doors were opened.
- (g) Bombing results as reported by crews:  
Aimed at right Target: YES \_\_\_ NO \_\_\_  
Results claimed: EXCEL \_\_\_ GOOD \_\_\_ FAIR \_\_\_ POOR \_\_\_ GROSS yes

S E C R E T



## S E C R E T

ANNEX "A"

BOMBING INFORMATION

IX B.C. FIELD ORDER NO. 110-720BOX IX, Flight 3 GROUP 416 DATE 25 Jan. 1945 TARGET ATTACKED Kell Road Junction

1. Method of Sighting: Pre-set with corrections.
2. Bombing approach: 106°
3. Was mercury erection system used? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO X
4. Did entire (box) (flight) drop on lead bombardier? YES X NO \_\_\_\_\_

In either case explain fully method of sighting and dropping of bombs, and specify exact aiming point actually used:


Pre-set with corrections. G-1 Auto Pilot not used.

5. Name of lead Bombardier: Lt. H.J. Bassett
6. Name of lead Pilot: Capt. R.H. Greenley
7. Intervalometer setting: Minimum
8. Indicated Air Speed: 210 Ground Speed: 254 Altitude: 11,200
9. Length of bomb run: 30 Sec:
10. Bomb Load and Fusing per A/C: 20 lb. x 500 lb. FUSED 1/10 N 1/10 T
11. Total Bombs Dropped: 28 1-26 6 x 500 lb. 1/10 1/10

12. Full statement of all factors affecting bombing - including: -

- (a) Did weather conditions or visibility adversely affect identification of target attacked or bombing. YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO X. If "YES" state conditions and effect.
- (b) Apart from weather or visibility, was any difficulty encountered in identifying target attacked, IP or AP? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO X. If answer is "YES", state circumstances and effect on bombing:
- (c) Did Flak affect bombing? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO X. If answer is "YES", state to what extent did flak affect bombing or bomb run:
- (d) To what extent did attacks by enemy aircraft affect bombing?
- (e) State any difficulties on bombing run:  
None
- (f) Malfunctions, personnel errors or other factors affecting bombing:  
None
- (g) Bombing results as reported by crews:  
Aimed at right Target: YES X NO \_\_\_\_\_  
Results claimed: EXCEL X GOOD \_\_\_\_\_ FAIR \_\_\_\_\_ POOR \_\_\_\_\_ GROSS \_\_\_\_\_

S E C R E T



SECRET  
 AUTH: CG, A-33  
 28 Jan 45  
 INITIAL:

HEADQUARTERS  
 415TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (L)  
 Office of the Commanding Officer

P-41-2


AFPO 140, U.S. Army,  
 28 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Mission Report.

TO : Commanding General, 9th Bombardment Division (M), AFPO 140, U.S. Army.  
 (Attn: A-4 Section)

I. 28 January 1945, T.O. 1022, Hall Road Junction, P.O. 140-075.

- |                                     |   |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|---|
| II. 43-22352<br>(Lt R.C. Bishop)    | Turret inoperative.                                       | The airplane was not called out because the turret man thought they could have it in before start engine time. The 51 speed signal solenoid was burned out.               |
| 41-36331<br>(Lt R.E. VanDyke)       | Left engine rough.  | Spark plugs fouled on left engine. Time on plugs was 78 hours and type C-34s.   |
| 43-22323<br>(Capt A.C. Moore)       | Left brake weak.  | Brakes checked by flight chief and operations officer and found O.K. Pilot error.   |
| III. 41-59315<br>(Lt R.H. Hall)     | Nose wheel failed to retract.                             | Nose wheel down latch out of adjustment caused by freezing moisture binding the locking plunger which stretched the adjusting rod.  |
| IV. 43-22324<br>(Capt G.N. McNulty) | Bombs released prematurely when bombay doors were opened. | Binding of tumbler contact in pilots release button causing immediate release of bombs when bomb door were opened since bomb master switch had been previously turned on. |
| 41-36264<br>(Lt J.K. Colquitt)      | All bombs returned.                                       | Pilot did not attempt to release because he realized flight leader released prematurely.  |
| 41-36213<br>(Lt E.L. Russell)       | All bombs returned.                                       | Bomb door safety switch plunger binding in open position causing  |





31-39349 Stations 4A, 5A, 2, 5A  
(Lt L.S. Poundstone) and 6A failed to release.

failure of switch to close lock nuts on actuating rod for adjustment had become loose allowing actuating mechanism to get out of adjustment.

43-27554 Station 4A failed to release.  
(Lt W.E. Hoinke)

lock in relay coil ground wire broken causing failure of intervalometer after release of first station.

Station not needed before loading.

45-22554 Station 3A failed to release.  
(Lt J.F. Smith)

Felt washer between A-4 release unit arm and unit body frozen causing binding of release arm.

45-27321 No attempt to bomb.  
(1st Lt J. Brucha)

Pilot realized that flight leader had released prematurely.

V. 45-22515 Nose wheel doors closed on nose wheel.  
(Lt W. McGroves)


Caused by nose wheel door holding catch slipping before wheel was fully retracted due to mal-adjustment of the turabuckles on the release bars.

- VI. 1 - 3:15 - 480  
2 - 3:15 - 450  
3 - 3:10 - 515  
4 - 3:10 - 525  
5 - 3:15 - 620  
6 - 3:10 - 610  
7 - 3:15 - 475  
8 - 3:15 - 570  
9 - 3:15 - 580  
10 - 3:15 - 600  
11 - 3:15 - 585  
12 - 3:15 - 435  
13 - Returned early.  
14 - 3:10 - 400  
15 - 3:10 - 525  
16 - 3:10 - 500  
17 - Not airborne.  
18 - 2:55 - 400  
19 - 2:55 - 400  
20 - 2:55 - 450


- 1 - 3:15 - 570  
2 - Not airborne.  
3 - 3:15 - 625  
4 - 3:15 - 475  
5 - 3:15 - 495  
6 - 2:55 - 400  
7 - 2:55 - 350  
8 - 2:55 - 475  
9 - 2:55 - 580  
10 - 3:05 - 495  
11 - 3:00 - 500  
12 - 2:45 - 425  
13 - 2:50 - 425  
14 - Not airborne.  
15 - 2:45 - 400  
16 - 2:45 - 475  
17 - 2:55 - 470

VII. None.

THEODORE E. AYLESWORTH,  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Commanding.







MISSION NO. 194

LOADING LIST  
BOX NO. 1  
FLIGHT 1

25 JANUARY 1945

44-  
1. 075 480 J  
Capt. D.A. Hulse ✓  
Lt. R. Conte ✓  
S/Sgt W.W. Donnelly ✓  
Sgt C.J. Kruger ✓

43-22  
2. 292 H 450  
Lt. J.F. Allen ✓  
S/Sgt L.R. Getgen ✓

43-22  
3. 381 Q 615  
Lt. D.E. Smith ✓  
Cpl R. Bostefano ✓

44-  
1. 173 W  
Capt. H.A. Monroe ✓  
Lt. R.L. Kirk ✓  
S/Sgt W.L. Kidd ✓  
Sgt A.P. Sgroi ✓

41-39  
2. 286 D  
Lt. J.A. Warren ✓  
S/Sgt S.M. Turpin ✓

43-2  
3. 2315 L-1  
Lt. W. Musgrove ✓  
S/Sgt H.O. Seighman ✓

43-21  
1. 467 W-1  
Lt. R.E. Singletary ✓  
Lt. A.E. Rosenquist ✓  
S/Sgt H.G. Wiggins ✓  
Sgt R.J. Kamischke ✓

41-3  
2. 9915 R  
Lt. R.E. Hall ✓  
S/Sgt L.O. Burger ✓

41-39  
3. 208 L-2  
Lt. E.O. Turner ✓  
S/Sgt J. Sienkiewicz ✓

FLIGHT II

43-22  
4. 354 S 575  
Lt. J.F. Smith ✓  
S/Sgt G.E. Reiter ✓

43-22  
5. 306 X 520  
Lt. C.M. Anderson ✓  
Cpl J.H. Deatherage ✓

43-22  
6. 290 510 L  
Lt. R.K. Johnson ✓  
Cpl H.E. Brandt ✓

43-22  
4. 334 G  
Lt. W.B. Heinke ✓  
S/Sgt G.B. VanWert ✓

5. ~~Lt. J.A. Cook~~  
~~Sgt F.H. Langley~~

43-22  
6. 307 N  
F/O J. Green ✓  
Sgt A. Kubjaiko ✓

41-39  
4. 250 A  
Lt. B.D. Grunig ✓  
Sgt H.J. Nowosielski ✓

FLIGHT III

43-22  
5. 913 B  
Lt. S.H. Sheley ✓  
Cpl E.J. Willever ✓


43-22  
6. 952 J-1  
Lt. I.B. Bishop ✓  
Sgt I.W. Hucutt ✓

WINDOW

43122  
026 400 M  
Lt. C.S. Stanley ✓  
F/O J.J. Elount ✓  
S/Sgt C.B. Collier ✓  
Cpl J.C. Edenburn ✓

43222  
063 400 A  
Lt. P.E. Parker ✓  
S/Sgt S. Kochan ✓  
S/Sgt P.G. Euga ✓

43222  
023 X  
Lt. G.L. Milhorn ✓  
Sgt D. Chest ✓  
Sgt E.J. Creeden ✓



MISSION NO. 194

LOADING LIST  
BOX II  
FLIGHT I

25 JANUARY 1945

1. 081 P 370  
Capt. B.D. Stebbins ✓  
Lt. A.S. Calloway ✓  
S/Sgt W.J. Brown ✓  
S/Sgt J.J. McGuire ✓

*not airborne  
Left Pump Room out.*

2. 931 C  
Lt. R.W. Van Noye ✓  
Cpl W.H. Klingman ✓

3. Capt. R.L. Babler  
Cpl E.B. Brinkman no a/c

FLIGHT II

1. 024 E 400  
Capt. G.M. McNulty ✓  
Lt. W. Forma ✓  
S/Sgt W.F. Fushner ✓  
S/Sgt K.G. Lagerman ✓

2. 264 I 450  
Lt. J.K. Colquitt ✓  
S/Sgt C.M. Mohr ✓

3. 213 A 475  
Lt. R.A. Russell ✓  
Cpl A.J. Musarre ✓

FLIGHT III

1. 106 E  
Capt. R.E. Greenley ✓ 425  
Lt. R.J. Bassett ✓  
S/Sgt C.R. Orvold ✓  
S/Sgt L.D. McElhattan ✓

2. 800 K  
Lt. J.H. Miller ✓ 425  
S/Sgt J. Galender ✓

3. 326 W  
Capt. A.C. Sears *not airborne  
Pilot reported crashed  
everybody. Checked O.K.*  
M/Sgt J.J. Wells ✓

4. 378 6 475  
Lt. M.W. DuBose ✓  
S/Sgt D.L. Griffin ✓

5. 233 F 475  
Lt. J.A. Willard ✓  
Lt. J. Britt ✓  
Cpl C.V. Hinker ✓

6. 349 B 475  
Lt. L.E. Foundstone ✓  
Pvt E.A. Arendt, Jr. ✓

4. 252 229 E B-1 550  
Lt. T.D. McCreedy ✓  
S/Sgt W.E. Lamonds ✓

5. 252 D 475  
Lt. J.W. Elevins ✓  
Sgt F. Gentry ✓

6. 321 T 500  
Lt. L.J. Prucha ✓  
Sgt L.C. Ferguson ✓

4. 249 F-1  
Lt. W.A. Merchant ✓  
S/Sgt R.J. Brown ✓

5. 265 V 475  
Lt. M. Wallman ✓  
Cpl M.F. Hardin ✓


6. 239 N  
Lt. L.W. Edstrom ✓ 425  
Cpl P.A. Pompe ✓

(18)

(17)

(16)

(28)






Mission No. 194

Box I

S Q D N	A / C LTR	A / C NO.	PILOT	D I S T A N C E	TARGET	A T O	ENG. COAST OUT	ENEMY COAST IN	T O T	ENEMY COAST OUT	ENG. COAST IN	C A M E R A	F U L L O A D	B O M B A D	E N D U R	L A T I T U D E	R E M A R K S
B	J	075	Hulse			1022										1335	3:15
B	H	292	Allen			1022										1333	3:15
B	Q	381	Smith, B. B.			1023										1332	3:10
B	S	354	Smith, G. F.			1023										1333	3:10
B	X	306	Anderson			1023										1335	3:15
R	L	290	Anderson			1024										1334	3:10
C	W	173	Monroe			1024										1338	3:15
C	D	286	Waters			1024										1338	3:15
C	L-1	2315	McGregor			1025										1339	3:15
C	G	334	Neible			1025										1339	3:15
C			Cook		No aircraft												
C	N	309	Burn			1026										1338	3:15
C	W-1	467	Lighting			1026										1337	3:15
C	F	2315	Phillips, R. B.			1027	1st	Coast								1336	3:10
C	L-2	208	Janner			1027										1336	3:10
D	A	250	Shumway			1027										1337	3:10
D	B	313	Haley			1028										1337	3:10
D	J-1	352	Bradley			1028	1st	Coast								1337	3:10




Mission No. 194

Box II

S Q D N	A / C LTR	A / C NO.	PILOT	D I S T A N C E	TARGET	A T O	ENG. COAST OUT	ENEMY COAST IN	T O T	ENEMY COAST OUT	ENG. COAST IN	C A M E R A	F U L L O A D	B O M B O A D	E N D U R	L A T I T U D E	R E M A R K S
A	P	081	Holtz			1028										1340	3:15
A	C	331	Bob Lopez														
A			Baldwin														
A	O	378	Burboe			1029										1341	3:15
A	F	333	Wilkens			1028										1342	3:15
A	B	349	Jordan			1029										1341	3:15
A	<del>B</del>	<del>349</del>	McMurry			1051										1326	2:35
A	F	364	Colquhitt			1030										1323	2:55
A	A	213	Kellogg			1030										1324	2:55
B	B-1	229	McCreedy			1031										1322	2:55
B	D	252	Johnson			1031										1326	3:05
A	T	321	Prueker			1031										1328	3:00
D	E	106	Shenley			1032										1325	2:45
D	K	300	Miller			1032										1319	2:50
●	W	326	<del>Miller</del> Lewis														
D	F-1	249	Mechant			1033										1317	2:45
D	V	365	Wallgren			1033										1318	2:45
D	N	239	Robson			1033										1320	2:55
A	M	026	Shenley			1034										1321	2:55
A	A	063	Faircl			1034										1321	2:55
D	X	023	McKern			1035										1321	2:55

Not Airborne  
Not Airborne  
Left Prop. Downward  
No Airights



IP

50901+

504501

69101

MAGAZINE  
IMAGINATION LIGHT  
HEAVY FLAM.




TARGET


SECRET

SECRET

ALL BOMBS GO - 25/1/46
F.D 140-720 T.O.T. 1226
BLITZ 12,000 11,500
WINDOW - YES 3 SHIPS
WATER - CLEAR - VIA BULLET BOARD
SIGHT HAZE
No SHIP MANIPULATED



SHIP NO	SQUADRON	PILOT and/or BOMBARDIER	MILES	MALFUNCTIONS	CAUSE OF MALFUNCTIONS			
Mission No. 194			M. Mappett			25 Jan 1945		
024	B	McNulty		Sunder released prematurely when target had dove into gun & began banking down	Banking of bomber control in flares release of flares causing immediate release of bombs which caused loss of ground since bomb master switch had been previously turned on			
264	A	Belquist		all bombs returned	Flare did not attempt to release. Spent down rapidly until blunger landing in gas position causing failure of switch to close. Switch was on reactor, need for adjustment of reactor, large attacking actuating mechanism to get out of adjustment.			
213	A	Russell		all bombs returned	High-in Relay coil ground wire broken causing failure of interlock to release of pilot attitude. Station not worked before landing.			
349	A	Roundstone		Station 4A, 3A & 5A and 6A failed to release - Station 4A failed to release	Jolt between between 4-5 release unit spin and unit body causing burning of release release			
334	C	Herkie		Station 3A failed to release	Flare did not attempt to release			
354	B	Smith, G.F.		all bombs returned	Mission G. G. Steward			
321	A	Fischer		all bombs returned				





756  
//

OIITA OIJJF OIJES OIJPO OIJKI V OIJEA OIJEA 06/25 OP OP  
T (OIITA PASS TO OIJJF)

FROM 97TH COMBAT BOMB WING 25/0225A  
TO COMBOMDIV IX  
COBOMGP 409  
COBOMGP 410  
COBOMGP 416  
1ST PROV PATHFINDER SQDN.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY BT  
SECRET SENT IN CLEAR AUTH: LT. COL. MC AFEE

97CEW J-274-E

97TH COMBAT BOMB WING  
A P O 140  
5 2 JANUARY 1945

FIELD ORDER NO. 140-720.


MAPS: NORMAL

1. B. (1) REFER. CURRENT BOMBLINE. FRIENDLY ARTILLERY WILL ATTEMPT TO NEUTRALIZE ENEMY FLAK BATTERIES WITHIN RANGE.  
(2) 19TH. T.A.C. WILL PROVIDE AREA COVER FOR THE 409TH AND 410TH BOMB GROUP.  
29TH T.A.C. WILL PROVIDE AREA COVER FOR THE 416TH BOMB GROUP.
2. THIS WING WILL ATTACK TARGETS IN GERMANY.

PLAN "A": ZERO HOUR 25/1200A  
PLAN "B": ZERO HOUR 25/1200A

PLAN "A"

3. A. 409TH BOMB GROUP.
  - (1) HILLESHEIM ROAD JUNCTIONS (L-242885)
  - (4) BASE TO I.P. TO TARGET .
  - (5) TARGET TURN LEFT TO R.P. TO BASE.
  - (7) 5025N 0602E
  - (8) GEN. ENR TO WSW
  - (9) H.P.I. - MAP SERIES G.S.G.S. 4414, SHEET 5706. TWO FLIGHTS ON EACH OF THE FOLLOWING GRID. COORD. 24008862; 24388838; AND 24308906.
  - (10) 5 X 500 G.P. FUSED: 1/10 SEC. NOSE 1/40 SEC. TAIL. MINIMUM INTERVALOMETER SETTING.
  - (11) 5025N 0602E
  - (12) T.O.T. - ZERO HOUR PLUS 20 MINUTES.
  - (13) IF VISUAL CONDITIONS DO NOT EXIST AT TARGET, GROUP WILL BOMB PRIMARY TARGET ON "GEE". IF "GEE" EQUIPMENT FAILS, BOMBS WILL BE RELEASED ON TARGET E.T.A.



## B. 416TH BOMB GROUP.

- (1) STADTKVILL ROAD JUNCTIONS (L-142953)
- (4) BASE TO I.P. TO TARGET.
- (5) TARGET TURN LEFT TO R.P. TO BASE.
- (7) 5025N 0602E
- (8) GEN. ENE TO WSW
- (9) M.P.I. - 9TH A.F. 2ND PHASE INTERP. REPORT US10/D548.  
3 FLIGHTS ON EACH OF THE FOLLOWING REF: #4710105; 05550030.
- (10) 6 X 500 G.P. FUSED: 1/10 SEC. NOSE 1/40 SEC. TAIL.
- (11) 5025N 0602E
- (12) T.O.T. ZERO HOUR
- (13) IF VISUAL CONDITIONS DO NOT EXIST AT TARGET, GROUP WILL BOMB PRIMARY TARGET ON "GEE". IF "GEE" EQUIPMENT FAILS, BOMBS WILL BE RELEASED ON TARGET E.T.A.

## C. 416TH BOMB GROUP.

- (1) KALL ROAD JUNCTION (F-169165)
- (4) BASE TO I.P. TO TARGET.
- (5) TARGET TURN RIGHT TO R.P. TO BASE.
- (7) 5035N 0551E
- (8) GEN. ENE TO WSW
- (9) M.P.I. - MAP SERIES G.S.G.S. 4414, SHEET 5405. GRID. COORD. 16651649.
- (10) 8 X 500 G.P. FUSED: 1/10 SEC. NOSE 1/40 SEC. TAIL. MINIMUM INTERVALOMETER SETTING.
- (11) 5035N 0551E
- (12) T.O.T. ZERO HOUR
- (13) IF CLOUD COVER PREVENTS VISUAL BOMBING, BOMBS WILL BE RETURNED TO BASE.
- (14) DROP 1,000 FEET AFTER LEAVING TARGET.


## X. (1) - (4) NO CHANGE.

- (5) A/C REQ: 36 A/C BOMBING BY FLIGHTS OF 6.
- (6) ALTITUDES: BOMB AT 12,000 FEET OR BELOW CLOUD BASE, DOWN TO BUT NOT BELOW 5,000 FEET.


## PLAN "B" PATHFINDER

## A. 409TH BOMB GROUP.

- (1) HILLESHEIM ROAD JUNCTIONS (L-242855)
- (4) BASE TO 5027N 0452E TO 5026N 0522E TO TARGET.
- (5) TARGET TURN LEFT TO 5025N 0602E TO BASE.
- (9) M.P.I. MAP SERIES G.S.G.S. 4414, SHEET 5706. TWO FLIGHTS ON EACH OF THE FOLLOWING GRID. COORD: 24008862; 24388838; AND 24308906. TO BE USED IF BOMBING IS VISUAL AND BY FLIGHTS. MAP SERIES G.S.G.S. 4414, SHEET 5706, GRID. COORD. 24208852 TO BE USED IF BOMBING IS VISUAL AND BY BOXES. PPF M.P.I. GRID. COORD. 24208852.
- (10) 8 X 500 G.P. FUSED: 1/10 SEC. NOSE, 1/40 SEC. TAIL. MINIMUM INTERVALOMETER SETTING.
- (12) T.O.T. ZERO HOUR PLUS 20 MINUTES.
- (13) GROUP WILL PROCEED ON BRIEFED P.P.F. ROUTE TO A POINT WHERE THE GROUP LEADER CAN ASCERTAIN THAT VISUAL BOMBING BY FLIGHTS OF 6 A/C IS POSSIBLE, WEATHER BEING THE DETERMINING FACTOR. IF VISUAL BOMBING BY FLIGHTS IS POSSIBLE, GROUP WILL PROCEED OR RETURN AS THE CASE MAY BE, TO VISUAL I.P. (5025N 0602E), TAKE INTERVAL AND BOMB BY FLIGHTS. IF BOMBING BY FLIGHTS IS IMPOSSIBLE BUT A SMALL BREAK IN THE CLOUDS MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO BOMB VISUALLY BY BOXES OF 18 A/C, GROUP WILL CONTINUE ON P.P.F. ROUTE AND BOMB VISUALLY BY BOXES OF 18 A/C. IF 10/10 CLOUD COVER OBSCURES TARGET, GROUP WILL BOMB IN THE FOLLOWING PRIORITY.



- A. PPF  
 B. GROUP "GEE"  
 C. TARGET E.T.A.
- (14) IF VISUAL CONDITIONS EXIST AT TARGET, BOMBING WILL BE BY VISUAL MEANS. THE DECISION TO BOMB VISUALLY WILL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE A-26 BOX LEADERS AND THEY WILL DO SO WHETHER THEY CAN CONTACT THE P.P.F. A/C OR NOT.
- (15) IF IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE A SECOND RUN FOR VISUAL BOMBING, GROUP WILL RETURN TO 5025N 0602E TO BEGIN RUN.
- B. 416TH BOMB GROUP.
- (1) STADTKVLL ROAD JUNCTIONS (L-142953)  
 (4) BASE TO 5027N 0452E TO 5028N 0542E TO TARGET.  
 (5) TARGET TURN LEFT TO 5025N 0602E TO BASE.  
 (9) M.P.I. 9TH A.F. 2ND PHASE INTERP. REPORT US10/D548. 3 FLIGHTS ON EACH OF THE FOLLOWING REFERENCES: 04710105 AND 05550050. TO BE USED IF BOMBING IS VISUAL AND BY FLIGHTS. 9TH A.F. 2ND PHASE INTERP. REPORT US10/D548. ONE BOX ON EACH OF THE FOLLOWING REFERENCES: 04710105 AND 05550050. TO BE USED IF BOMBING IS VISUAL AND BY BOXES. P.P.F. M.P.I. GRID. COORD. 14239521.  
 (10) 6 X 500 G.P. FUSED: 1/10 SEC. NOSE 1/40 SEC. TAIL.  
 (12) T.O.T. ZERO HOUR PLUS 5 MINUTES.  
 (13) GROUP WILL PROCEED ON BRIEFED PPF ROUTE TO A POINT WHERE THE GROUP LEADER CAN ASCERTAIN THAT VISUAL BOMBING BY FLIGHTS OF 6 A/C IS POSSIBLE, WEATHER BEING THE DETERMINING FACTOR. IF VISUAL BOMBING BY FLIGHTS IS POSSIBLE, GROUP WILL PROCEED OR RETURN, AS THE CASE MAY BE, TO THE VISUAL I.P. (5025N 0602E), TAKE INTERVAL AND BOMB BY FLIGHTS. IF BOMBING BY FLIGHTS IS IMPOSSIBLE BUT A SMALL BREAK IN THE CLOUDS MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO BOMB VISUALLY BY BOXES OF 18 A/C, GROUP WILL CONTINUE ON PPF ROUTE AND BOMB VISUALLY BY BOXES OF 18 A/C. IF 10/10 CLOUD COVER OBSCURES TARGET, GROUP WILL BOMB IN THE FOLLOWING PRIORITY.  
 A. PPF  
 B. GROUP "GEE"  
 C. TARGET E.T.A.
- (14) IF VISUAL CONDITIONS EXIST AT TARGET, BOMBING WILL BE BY VISUAL MEANS. THE DECISION TO BOMB VISUALLY WILL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE A-26 BOX LEADERS AND THEY WILL DO SO WHETHER THEY CAN CONTACT THE PPF A/C OR NOT
- (15) IF IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE A SECOND RUN FOR VISUAL BOMBING, GROUP WILL RETURN TO 5025N 0602E TO BEGIN RUN
- C. 416TH BOMB GROUP
- (1) KALL ROAD JUNCTION (F-165165)  
 (4) BASE TO 5027N 0452E TO 5039N 0545E TO TARGET  
 (5) TARGET TURN RIGHT TO 5035N 0551E TO BASE  
 (9) M.P.I. MAP SERIES C368 4414 SHEET 5405, GRID COORD. 16651649. TO BE USED IF BOMBING IS VISUAL BY FLIGHTS OR BOXES. PPF M.P.I. GRID COORD. 16651649.  
 (10) 8 X 500 G.P. FUSED 1/10 SEC. NOSE 1/40 SEC. TAIL MINIMUM INTERVALOMETER SETTING  
 (12) T.O.T. - ZERO HOUR  
 (13) GROUP WILL PROCEED ON BRIEFED PPF ROUTE TO A POINT WHERE THE GROUP LEADER CAN ASCERTAIN THAT VISUAL BOMBING BY FLIGHTS OF 6 A/C IS POSSIBLE, WEATHER BEING THE DETERMINING FACTOR. IF VISUAL BOMBING BY FLIGHTS IS POSSIBLE, GROUP WILL PROCEED OR RETURN, AS THE CASE MAY BE, TO VISUAL I.P. (5035N 0551E), TAKE INTERVAL AND BOMB BY FLIGHTS. IF BOMBING BY FLIGHTS IS IMPOSSIBLE, BUT A SMALL BREAK IN THE CLOUDS MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO BOMB VISUALLY BY BOXES OF 18 A/C, GROUP WILL CONTINUE ON PPF ROUTE AND BOMB VISUALLY BY BOXES OF 18 A/C. IF 10/10 CLOUD OBSCURES TARGET, GROUP WILL BOMB ON PPF A/C ONLY.
- (14) IF VISUAL CONDITIONS EXIST AT TARGET, BOMBING WILL BE BY VISUAL MEANS. THE DECISION TO BOMB VISUALLY IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE A-26 BOX LEADERS AND THEY WILL DO SO WHETHER THEY CONTACT THE PPF A/C OR NOT.
- (15) IF IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE A SECOND RUN FOR VISUAL BOMBING, GROUP WILL RETURN TO 5035N 0551E TO BEGIN RUN.



- X. (1) - (4) NO CHANGE
- (5) A/C REQ. - 2 BOXES OF 18 A/C WITH 1 PPF A/C
- (6) ALTITUDE - BOMB AT 12,500 FEET. MINIMUM ALTITUDE FOR VISUAL BOMBING IS 5,000 FEET

4. NO CHANGE

5. COMMUNICATIONS:

A. 409TH BOMB GROUP: (242885)

- (2) PEDLAR
- (3) BULLSEYE
- (4) RIPSAW

B. 410TH BOMB GROUP: (142953)

- (2) WAYSIDE
- (3) BULLSEYE
- (4) RIPSAW

C. 416TH BOMB GROUP: (165165)

- (2) MURKY
- (3) JUDITH
- (4) SWEEPSTAKE

X. GENERAL INFORMATION:

- (11) GROUP LEADERS CALL "COCKSPUR" ON "C" 10 MINUTES PRIOR TO REACHING TROOP LINE AND NOTIFY IF ON TIME OR HOW MUCH EARLY OR LATE. GROUP LEADERS CALL "COCKSPUR" ON "C" WHEN LEAVING TARGET AREA.

COMCDTWIG 97


BT 0225A

CC: PLAN "B" PAR. A. (13) EIGHTH CR CORRECTED TO READ "WEATHER"  
REPEAT "WEATHER"

LCB/RL AR

OEJES R.....25/0345A	JAB	AR
OIJKI R.....25/0345A	EW	AR
OIJPO R.....250345A	AL	AR
OLITA R.....25/0350A	MD	AC

DIA





753

OIJKI V OIJEA OIJEA 02/25 OP OP

FROM 97TH COMBAT BOMB WING 25/0045A  
TO COBOMCP 416

SECRET SENT IN CLEAR AUTH: LT. COL. MC AFEE BT

97CBW J-270-E

INTELLIGENCE SUPPLEMENT 1 FIELD ORDER 140-720.

- (1) TARGET: KALL ROAD JUNCTION AT WF-165165. FOR EXACT MPI, SEE FIELD ORDER NO. 140-720.
- (2) THIS ROAD JUNCTION IS ON THE LATERAL COMMUNICATION LINE BETWEEN THE COLOGNE SECTOR AND THE EIFFEL SECTOR. IT IS IN THE GENERAL VICINITY OF THE RECENT ATTACKS ON ENEMY M/T CONVOYS. ONCE AGAIN, THE ATTACK IS DESIGNED TO BLOCK THE JUNCTION, THUS PREVENTING MOVEMENT EITHER WAY. THIS HELPS TO ISOLATE THE EIFFEL SECTOR FROM SUPPLIES AND THE COLOGNE SECTOR FROM REINFORCEMENTS, RECENTLY IN THE EIFFEL AREA. THE ENEMY DIVISIONS ARE SPREAD VERY THINLY NORTH OF THE EIFFEL AREA WITH NO ARMOR, AND IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE ENEMY WOULD LIKE TO PROTECT THE RUHR WITH MUCH GREATER STRENGTH.

(3) MAP COVERAGE:

G.S.G.S. 4414 SHEET NO. 5405

PHOTO COVERAGE

5006E/5405

IX TAC T/228

IX TAC D/439

IX BD/SA 701

US 7 GR/3788 PRINT NO. 4100 AND 3103

(4) TARGET IS ABOUT NINE MILES SOUTH EAST OF BOMBLINE.

(5) FLAK: REFER TO PLOTTED POSITIONS.

(6) THIS TARGET HAS NOT BEEN ATTACKED BEFORE, AND YOUR GROUP WILL ATTACK IT ALONE, EITHER UNDER PLAN "A" OR "B".


COMCBTWIG 97

BT 0045A

RL AR K

OIJKI R.....25/0115A

EW AR



ITA JEA V JKI JKI 21/25 P-P  
T- ITA PASS TO JJF


FROM 416TH BOMB GROUP (L) 25/2130A  
TO 9TH BOMBARDMNT DIVISION (M)  
INFO COPY 97TH COMBAT BOMBARDMENT WING (L)  
CO 1ST PATHFINDER SQUADRON (PROV)

CONFIDENTIAL BT

416 BG J-391-E 25 JANUARY 1945  
PPF LEAD OF FORMATION SATISFACTORY EXCEPT PPF AIRCRAFT MADE PEEL OFF  
TO RIGHT INSTEAD OF TO THE LEFT AS BRIEFED.

AYLESWORTH COBOMGR 416

BT 252130  
FD BBB  
ITA R.....25/2225A DF KK  
JEA R.....25/2225A WCB KKK



ITA JEA V JKI 15/25 OP OP

FROM 416TH BOMB GROUP (L) 251630A  
 TO CG, 9TH BOMB DIVISION ATT: A-2  
 CG, 9TH BOMBAT WING ATT: A-2  
 CONFIDENTIAL BT  
 J-385-D  
 OPSFLASH FOR 25 JAN 1945.

- A. 416TH BOMB GP.  
 B. HALL ROAD JUNCTION (F-165165)  
 C. 9 A-20'S AND 25 A-26'S (INCLUDING KXXXXX 3 A-20'S CARRIED WINDOW ONLY)  
 D. 6 A-20'S AND 21 A-26'S.  
 E. 3 A-20'S (CARRIED WINDOW ONLY)  
 1 A-26 RETURNED EARLY WHEN NOSE WHEEL WOULD NOT RETRACT.  
 3 A-26'S FAILED TO BOMB BECAUSE LEADER'S BOMBS KXXXXX WENT AWAY UPON HIS OPENING BOMBAY DOORS. KXXXXX REALISED IT WAS PREMATURE RELEASE, AND HELD BOMBS.  
 F. 127 X 500 GP ON PRIMARY.  
 16 X 500 GP PREMATURELY RELEASED AT F-075160  
 3/25 X 500 GP RETURNED.  
 G. BOX 1  
 FLIGHT 1- FAIR  
 2- GOOD  
 3- GOOD  
 BOX 2  
 FLIGHT 1- EXCELLENT  
 2- PREMATURE (AT F-075160)  
 3- GOOD.  
 H. NONE  
 I. NONE  
 J. MEAGER INACCURATE LIGHT AND HEAVY FLAK AT KXXXXXXX (F-010147)  
 STRAY SINGLE BURSTS VERY INACCURATE IN TURN OFF TARGET.  
 K. NONE  
 L. 12000 - 11,500 (INDICATED AXXXXXXX ALTITUDE)  
 M. 1226 (2ND RUN)  
 N. HEAVY TRAFFIC REPORTED ON ROAD LEADING N. OUT OF TARGET. NO FURTHER DETAILS KNOWN BY CREWS.  
 HOMING AND FIX REPORTS:  
 AT K-320180 5 MIN BEFORE I.O. (VERVIERS) LEADER CALLED "COCKSPUR"  
 ACCURATE FIX CAME IN ONE (1) MINUTE.

---AYLESWORTH COBOMCH 416---

BT 251630A

DM AS


CC: UNDER PARA E. SECOND LINE 7TH WD SHOULD READ LEADER'S  
 REPT LEADER'S AND ALSO UNDER PARA X. NEXT TO LAST LINE OF  
 TEXT 6TH WD SHOULD BE I.OXXXXXX. I.P. REPT I.P.

AR

JEA R.....25/1715A NCB AR

ITA R.....251714A ME AR

BBBBBBBBBBB



ITA JEA V JKI JKI 26/25 OP-OP

FROM HQS 416TH BOMB GROUP (L) 25/2030A  
 TO 97TH COMBAT WING (L) ATTN: STAFF DUTY OFFICER  
 9TH BOMB DIVISION (M) ATTN: A-2 DUTY OFFICER

SECRET BT

J-330-D

D. KALL ROAD JUNCTION

G. 1212 - 1227

J. BOX I FLT. A EXCEL. ALL BOMBS WITHIN 1000 FT. OF DMPI WITH CENTER OF BURSTS 750 FT. SE OF DMPI. BOMBS FELL IN OPEN FIELDS.

FLT. B EXCEL. 65 PERCENT OF BOMBS WITHIN 1000 FT. OF DMPI WITH CENTER OF PATTERN 515 FT. SW OF DMPI. BOMBS FELL IN TWO PATTERNS; 1 BEING 273 FT. SE OF DMPI AND THE OTHER BEING 753 FT. SW OF DMPI. BOMBS HIT ACROSS RR TRACKS, HIGHWAY, AND BUILDINGS, PROBABLY DESTROYING RR CARS AND DAMAGING ROAD AND BUILDINGS.

FLT. C UNSAT. NO BOMBS WITHIN 1000 FT. OF DMPI. CENTER OF PATTERN FALLS 1430 FT. SW OF DMPI. BLANKET OF BURSTS ACROSS RR TRACKS, HIGHWAY AND BUILDINGS DESTROYING ROLLING STOCK AND DAMAGING TRACKS, HIGHWAY AND BUILDINGS.

BOX IIN/FLT. A SUPER. ALL BOMBS WITHIN 1000 FT. OF DMPI WITH CENTER OF BURSTS 100 FT. NE OF DMPI. EXCELLENT PATTERN ON DMPI COVERING ROADS AND BUILDINGS AND RAILROAD.

FLT. B PNB. WHEN LEAD SHIP OPENED ITS BOMB-BAY DOORS THE BOMBS FELL OUT. 2 OTHER A/C BOMBED ON THIS SHIP. BOMBS FELL IN WOODS APPROX. 10 MILES NW OF TARGET (1:100,000 MAP S-1 COORD. 007188) REMAINING 3 A/C DID NOT BOMB.

FLT. C EXCEL. ALL BOMBS WITHIN 1000 FT. OF DMPI. WITH CENTER OF PATTERN 500 FT. SE OF DMPI. BOMBS HIT IN OPEN FIELDS.


K. UNSATISFACTORY BOMBING REPORT.

BOX I FLT. C UNSAT. BOMBARDIER UNABLE TO IDENTIFY AP UNTIL VERY LATE IN RUN. NOT SYNCHRONIZED AT RELEASE.

M. 10 100 PERCENT  
 0 00 PERCENT  
 0 00 PERCENT

BT 25/2030A  
 FD AR  
 ITA R.....25/2100 BIRD AR.  
 JEA R.....25/2100A WCB AR

T





ITA JEA V JKI JKI 13/25 P - P

FROM COBOMGR 416 25/1500A  
TO COMBOMDIV NINE ATT: COM OFFICER  
COMCETWIC 97 (INFO)

CONFIDENTIAL BT

416BG J-383-J

- A - YS - 23
- B - 25 JAN 45 (1022-1257)
- C - T-TARE AND P- PETER REPORTED RESULTS OF MISSION TO DIVISION HEADQUARTERS.
- D - T-TARE CONTACTED AND RECEIVED A FIX FROM FIGHTER GROUND CONTROL CENTER. P-PETER WAS INSTRUCTED PREVIOUS TO TAKE OFF, NOT TO CALL FIGHTER CONTRDL CENTER. T-TARE CONTACTED COCKSPUR PREVIOUS TO CROSSING TROOP LINE, AGAIN BEFORE STARTING A SECOND RUN AND FINALLY UPON LEAVING THE AREA. T-TARE REPORTED EXCELLENT CONTACT WITH COCKSPUR.
- E - NONE
- F - NONE
- G - NONE
- H - NONE
- I - NONE
- J - NONE
- K - NONE

AYLESWORTH COBOMGR416

BT 25/1500A  
AS  
EJ AR K

ITA R.....251538A ME B(JKI)  
JEA R.....251538A FK AR

